How should we regulate systemic risk? Many regulatory responses, like the Dodd-Frank Act in the United States, consist largely of politically motivated reactions to the financial crisis, looking for villains (whether or not they exist).
2 To be most effective, however, the regulation must be situated within a more analytical framework.
I. SCOPE AND GOALS OF REGULATION
First, we need to consider the scope of systemic risk regulation. There has been a great deal of regulatory focus on banks and other financial institutions (hereinafter, "financial firms"). Some of this is path dependent:
historically, a chain of bank failures remains an important symbol of systemic risk. The media and politicians also have focused on financial firms because they are so visible and their problems have been so dramatic.
But we also need to recognize that the ongoing trend towards disintermediation-enabling companies to directly access the ultimate source of funds, the capital markets, without going through financial intermediaries-is making financial markets themselves increasingly central to any examination of systemic risk. filled the headlines, its trigger was the collapse of the market for mortgage-2 The Dodd-Frank Act delegates much of the regulatory details to administrative rulemaking, in many cases after the relevant government agencies engage in further study. Perhaps even more significantly, the Act creates a Financial Stability Oversight Council, part of whose mission is to monitor and identify potential systemic threats in order to find regulatory gaps. Dodd-Frank Act § 112. The Council will be aided in this task by a newly-created and, hopefully, nonpartisan Office of Financial Research. Id. Regulators therefore will have the ability to look beyond the Act's confines. 3 Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL 193, 200 (2008) .
backed securities. Many of these securities were collateralized in part by risky subprime home mortgages, which were expected to be refinanced through home appreciation. When home prices stopped appreciating, the borrowers could not refinance. In many cases, they defaulted. These defaults caused substantial amounts of investment-grade rated mortgage-backed securities to be downgraded and, in some cases, to default. Investors began losing confidence in these and other rated securities, and their market prices started falling.
Lehman Brothers, which held large amounts of mortgage-backed securities, was particularly exposed. Lehman's counterparties began demanding additional safeguards, which Lehman could not provide. Absent a government bailout, Lehman filed for bankruptcy. That, in turn, caused securities markets to panic; even the short-term commercial paper market virtually shut down, and the market prices of mortgage-backed securities collapsed substantially below the intrinsic value of the mortgage loans backing those securities. 4 That accelerated the death spiral, causing financial firms holding mortgage-backed securities to appear, if not be, more financially risky; requiring highly leveraged firms to engage in fire-sales of assets (thereby exacerbating the fall in prices); and shutting off credit markets, which impacted the real economy.
This illustrates that both financial firms and financial markets can, if they fail, be triggers and transmitters of systemic risk. The scope of any 4 Even prior to Lehman's collapse, MBS may have been undervalued in the market. For example, in July 2008 I was an expert in the Orion Finance SIV case in the English High Court of Justice. Orion's mortgage-backed securities had a market value of around 22 cents on the dollar, whereas the present value of its reasonably-expected cash flows was around 88 cents on the dollar because most of the mortgages were prime.
regulatory framework for managing systemic risk should therefore include both financial firms and markets.
Before attempting to design such a regulatory framework, we need to examine what the framework's goals should be. The primary goal for regulating financial risk is micro-prudential: maximizing economic efficiency. Systemic risk is a form of financial risk, so efficiency should certainly be a goal in its regulation. But systemic risk also represents risk to the financial system itself. Any framework for regulating systemic risk therefore should include this macro-prudential goal: protecting the financial system itself.
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II. MAXIMIZING ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY WITHIN THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM
Financial regulation can help to maximize economic efficiency by correcting market failures. I believe that at least four types of partly interrelated market failures occur within the financial system: information failure, rationality failure, principal-agent failure, and incentive failure.
A. Correcting Information Failure
Complexity is the main cause of financial information failure. This begs the question whether institutional investors will hire experts as needed to decipher complex deals. The evidence suggests they do not always do so, and theory explains why. Although experts may be hired to the extent that their costs do not exceed the benefits gained from more fully understanding the complexity, at some level of complexity those costs will exceed, or at least appear to exceed any potential gain. This is because the cost of hiring experts is tangible, whereas the benefit gained from fully understanding complex transactions is intangible and harder to quantifyespecially since constantly innovating markets cause rapid informational obsolescence. Managers attempting a cost-benefit analysis may well give greater weight to the tangible cost and less credence to any intangible benefit. The more complex the transaction, the higher the costs, and thus the more likely it is that the cost-benefit balance will be out of equilibrium. The regulatory hurdle is that human nature cannot be easily changed.
It is unclear-and Dodd-Frank does not address-how complacency can be remedied. And although panics are often the triggers that commence a chain of systemic failures, it is impossible to identify all the causes of panics that can trigger systemic risk.
C. Correcting Principal-Agent Failure
Scholars have long studied inefficiencies resulting from conflicts of interest between managers and owners of firms. The Dodd-Frank Act attempts to fix this traditional type of conflict. It ignores, however, a much more insidious principal-agent failure: the intra-firm problem of secondarymanagement conflicts. 24 The nub of the problem is that secondary managers Let's next discuss the second goal of any regulatory framework for managing systemic risk-protecting the financial system itself. Although uncorrected market failures can lead to inefficiencies in the allocation of capital within the financial system, they also can contribute to systemic failures.
III. PROTECTING THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM ITSELF
There are at least three ways that regulation could protect the financial system itself. First, regulation could attempt to limit the triggers of systemic 31 In other contexts, I have summarized these markets failures more intuitively as the "3Cs" of complexity, conflicts, and complacency-complexity corresponding to information failure and incentive failure; conflicts corresponding to principal-agent failure; and complacency corresponding to rationality failure. We argue that two otherwise independent correlations can combine to transmit localized economic shocks into broader systemic crises. The first is an intra-firm correlation between a firm's financial integrity and its exposure to risk from low-probability adverse events that either constitute or could lead to economic shocks. The second is a system-wide correlation among financial firms and markets.
34 See Regulating Complexity in Financial Markets, supra note 6, at 248-49. One aspect of chaos theory is deterministic chaos in dynamic systems, which recognizes that the more complex the system, the more likely it is that failures will occur. Thus, the most successful (complex) systems are those in which the consequences of failures are limited. In engineering design, for example, this can be done by decoupling systems through modularity that helps to reduce a chance that a failure in one part of the system will systemically trigger a failure in another part. This represented a failure of these firms to see, or at least to fully appreciate, the intra-firm correlation between low-probability risk-in this case, the risk that home prices would significantly fall-and firm integrity.
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The 2008 financial crisis also involved a failure to see system-wide correlations-not only the tight interconnectedness among banks and nonbank financial firms but also the tight interconnectedness between financial 37 To some extent, the U.S. government itself pressured banks and other mortgage lenders to make and securitize subprime mortgage loans, in order to expand homeownership. 39 The problem of assessing the risk of low-probability adverse events is especially acute during periods in which there have been no major adverse economic shocks. Recent stability then allays fears of adverse occurrences, and market participants begin to view the recent event-data as following a normal distribution, in which observations that deviate dramatically from the mean lie in the distribution's thin tails. In reality, however, longer-term data may reveal a distribution of outcomes with higher kurtosis, or "fat tails," so that the true risk of extreme events is far greater than it is under a normal distribution. Market participants may also underestimate mundane low-probability events. Unusual events, such as a large meteor hitting the earth, are highly salient, whereas more mundane events, such as changes in collateral value, are commonplace, possibly existing on a continuum. 43 Regulators therefore need to turn to ways to stabilize the financial system that go beyond limiting the transmission of systemic shocks.
C. Stabilizing the Afflicted Financial System
Regulation could also work ex post even after a systemic shock has been triggered and is being transmitted. The regulation would then attempt to stabilize the afflicted financial system. This could be done by trying to stabilize systemically important firms and financial markets impacted by the 40 The tight interconnectedness described above also can have a temporal component insofar as the connections, being interactive, work too quickly to control. See supra note 7. 41 See supra note 31 and accompanying text. 42 Information and incentive failure, for example, can cause failures to identify or fully appreciate both correlations: between low-probability risk and firm integrity, and among financial firms and markets. Rationality failure can also foster failures to identify or fully appreciate the first correlation: between lowprobability risk and firm integrity. And principal-agent failure can result in a failure to identify or fully appreciate the first correlation: between low-probability risk and firm integrity. See Anabtawi & Schwarcz, supra note 36. 43 Cf. supra note 37 (noting that misguided government policy can contribute to systemic risk). Being driven by short-term political decisions and other non-economic factors, government policy will always be a risk factor.
transmission. 44 This approach again takes inspiration from chaos theory, insofar as that theory holds that remedies should also focus on limiting the consequences of failures.
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There are at least two ways that regulation could stabilize systemically important firms and financial markets: by ensuring liquidity to those firms and markets, and by requiring those firms and markets to be more internally robust.
Ensuring Liquidity to Firms and Markets. Liquidity has
traditionally been used, especially by government central banks, to help prevent financial firms from defaulting. The U.S. Federal Reserve Bank, for example, has had this role of lender of last resort to banks. 46 And the European Commission is in the process of attempting to help recapitalize European banks that are exposed to sovereign-debt risk.
Ensuring liquidity to stabilize systemically important firms would follow this pattern, except that the source of the liquidity could at least be partly privatized by taxing those firms to create a systemic risk fund.
Privatizing the source of liquidity would help to address the public costs of a lender of last resort: the shifting to taxpayers of the costs of loans that are not repaid, and the fostering of moral hazard that could result by encouraging financial firms-especially those that believe they are "too big to fail"-to be fiscally reckless. Also, internalizing costs by privatizing the 44 To the extent regulation stabilizes a systemically important firm that otherwise would be failing due to endogenous or non-systemic exogenous causes, the regulation could also be viewed as an ex ante solution. he CPFF indeed had a stabilizing effect on the commercial paper market"). This is very different from quantitative easing, in which a central bank purchases securities as a form of monetary policy. For example, the U.S. Federal Reserve has been engaged in quantitative easing programs, purchasing U.S. Treasury securities in order to hold down long-term interest rates. In contrast, I contemplate the task of a market liquidity provider of last resort as much more targeted: to prevent market collapses due to panic.
This same approach can be applied more broadly to respond to panic in securities market. 57 Say, for example, that the intrinsic value-effectively the present value of the expected value of the underlying cash flows-of a type of mortgage-backed security is estimated to be in the range of 80 cents on the dollar. If the market price of those securities had fallen significantly below that number, say, to 20 cents on the dollar, the market liquidity provider could purchase these securities at, say, 60 cents on the dollar, thereby stabilizing the market and still making a profit. To induce a holder of the mortgage-backed securities to sell at that price, the market liquidity provider could, for example, agree to pay a higher "deferred purchase price"
if the securities turn out to be worth more than expected. 58 This is just one (simplified) example of the flexible pricing approaches used in structured financing transactions to buy financial assets of uncertain value which could be adapted to a market liquidity provider's purchases. 
Requiring Firms and Markets to be More Internally Robust.
Regulation could also help to stabilize systemically important firms 57 One might ask why, if a market liquidity provider of last resort can invest at a deep discount to stabilize markets and still make money, private investors would not also do so, thereby eliminating the need for some sort of governmental market liquidity provider. One answer is that individuals at investing firms will not want to jeopardize their reputations (and jobs) by causing their firms to invest at a time when other investors have abandoned the market. Another answer is that private investors usually want to buy and sell securities, without having to wait for their maturities; whereas a market liquidity provider of last resort should be able to wait until maturity, if necessary. 59 Alternatively, a market liquidity provider of last resort could attempt to stabilize the market by entering into derivatives contracts to strip out risks that the market has the greatest difficulty hedging-in effect, the market's irrationality element-thereby stimulating private investment. By hedging-and not actually purchasing securities directly-the market liquidity provider would appear to be taking less investment risk, and thus its function may be seen as more politically acceptable. Id.
and markets by requiring them to be more internally robust. 60 This could be accomplished in various ways. First consider firms.
The Dodd-Frank Act, for example, requires banks and, to the extent designated as "systemically important," other financial firms to be subject to a range of capital and similar requirements. 61 Addressing the possibility that a firm could nevertheless end up failing, the Act also requires these firms to submit a resolution plan-a so-called "living will"-that sets forth how the firm would liquidate in an orderly manner to minimize further systemic impact.
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The extent to which these types of approaches will work, and their Regulation could protect the financial system in at least three ways:
by limiting the triggers of systemic risk, by limiting the transmission of systemic shocks, and by attempting to stabilize the system. Eliminating the triggers of systemic risk is not feasible. Eliminating the transmission of systemic shocks is likewise not feasible.
It therefore is critical to try to stabilize the financial system against the consequences of systemic shocks. This will involve stabilizing both systemically important financial firms and markets impacted by the shocks. I have examined two approaches to stabilization: ensuring liquidity to those firms and markets, and requiring those firms and markets to be more internally robust.
I am reasonably comfortable with the first approach (ensuring liquidity), especially if the source of the liquidity could be privatized. That not only would stabilize firms and markets but also would help to control the motivation of systemically important firms to externalize their costs (and thus reduce public costs). The extent to which regulation can efficiently require systemically important firms and markets to be more internally robust is a more open question. 75 For a discussion of market circuit breakers, see, e.g., Anabtawi & Schwarcz, supra note 36, at 1398-1401.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
I have attempted to build an analytical framework for regulating systemic risk. Any such framework, however, will be imperfect and have tradeoffs. Complexity and complacency, among other factors, make ex-ante preventive regulation insufficient. Regulation therefore must operate ex post as well, by attempting to limit the transmission of systemic risk and reduce systemic consequences.
For example, regulation to limit principal-agent failures by paying managers, including secondary managers, under longer-term compensation schemes would operate ex ante, or preventively. To avoid prejudicing the competitiveness of firms in any given nation (or, as in the EU, any region),
this type of regulation ideally should be global.
Regulation to provide liquidity to systemically important firms and markets would operate more ex post, by helping to stabilize the financial system. The source of this liquidity could-and arguably should-be privatized by requiring firms to contribute to a systemic risk fund. That type of requirement should (again) ideally be global to avoid prejudicing the competitiveness of any nation or region-a fact that the European Commission has recognized in connection with its similar proposal to impose a tax on the financial sector.
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Thank you.
76 See supra notes 50-53 and accompanying text.
